Iranian Advisor says that the Strait of Hormuz will not open until Iran's conditions are met

Conditional language of this kind is the standard negotiating posture in Hormuz episodes: Iran has repeatedly used the threat or framing of closure as leverage, and the historical base rate is that the strait is not actually blocked for sustained periods, since closure cuts off Iran's own exports and invites a naval response from the US Fifth Fleet and partners. The operative distinction is between rhetoric that keeps the risk premium in crude and an actual physical disruption, which would transmit through tanker traffic, war-risk insurance premia and freight rates before showing up in prompt spreads; roughly a fifth of global oil supply transits the chokepoint, so even partial interference steepens the front of the curve and lifts timespreads rather than the outright level alone. Sourcing matters here: an advisor is not the Supreme Leader, the IRGC or the oil ministry, and unofficial channels have historically been used to float positions before principals confirm or walk them back. What defines the trajectory is whether conditions are named publicly, whether shipping notices, insurance repricing or tanker diversions corroborate any physical dimension, and whether Gulf producers and the US signal workarounds via pipelines that bypass the strait. Absent corroboration of physical disruption, episodes of this kind have tended to fade from the premium as quickly as they entered it.