Iran-Oman deal on Strait of Hormuz ‘doesn’t matter’ as Trump controls blockade, reports NY Post citing US official; the deal, which an IRGC spokesman claimed was reached on Wednesday, remains subject to internal approval in Iran and lacks US recognition

Disputed or unilateral claims of a deal over the Strait of Hormuz have a long history of whipsawing crude on the headline before the details retrace the move, and this one carries two classic caveats: internal Iranian approval pending and no recognition from the party that effectively controls the chokepoint. The relevant distinction is between a bilateral transit arrangement, which Oman and Iran have explored in various forms over the years without altering shipping flows, and an internationally recognised reopening, which is what actually moves tanker rates, war-risk insurance premia, and the Brent prompt spread. Washington's posture here, an unnamed official dismissing the deal alongside an active sanctions-pressure campaign, fits the established pattern of back-channel noise coexisting with public maximalism; previous episodes of this kind have tended to see the initial risk-premium unwind partially fade as the enforcement reality reasserts. Worth noting is the threat directed at Oman itself, since Muscat's traditional mediator role is what has historically made such frameworks possible at all. The follow-ons are confirmation or denial from Tehran's official channels, any shift in insurance quotes or tanker traffic through the strait, and whether Treasury's pressure campaign escalates against Omani entities. Until freight and insurance pricing corroborate a change in physical flows, the tape is trading rhetoric, not barrels.