US Central Command says the Strait of Hormuz remains open for commercial vessel transit. Iran does not control it.

Public affirmations that Hormuz remains open tend to surface after tanker seizures, harassment incidents, or Iranian rhetoric has already put a war-risk premium into crude and into freight and insurance rates, and the statement itself is usually aimed at capping that premium rather than responding to an actual closure, which has never fully occurred even in past tanker-war episodes. The operative question is always whether such assurances reflect calm or pre-emption: historically the premium has unwound only when the assurance is corroborated by transit data, stable war-risk insurance quotes, and quiet on the seizure front, not by the statement alone. The distinction worth drawing is between transit risk and supply risk; open strait language addresses the first, while any concurrent strikes on export infrastructure would re-price the second regardless of what CENTCOM says about shipping lanes. The actors here have track records: Tehran's pattern has been calibrated pressure short of closure, and US military communications of this kind have previously preceded both de-escalation and escort or strike operations. The tells are tanker traffic through the strait, insurance and freight quotes on Gulf loadings, and whether Iranian officials echo or contradict the framing. A denial that Iran controls the waterway also reads as a message to Tehran as much as to markets.