Details of the initial text of the strategic plan for managing the Strait of Hormuz: The passage of vessels belonging to the US, the Israelis, and other hostile countries through the Strait of Hormuz will be prohibited

• According to this plan:
• The passage of vessels belonging to the United States, Israelis and other hostile countries through the Strait of Hormuz will be prohibited.
• Ships related to Israel, whether military or civilian, will not have the right to transit through this area.
• Vessels or cargoes that play a role in actions against the Resistance Front will also be subject to the ban.
• Countries and individuals that have caused damage to Iran will not receive permission to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf until compensation is paid.
• Heavy fines, including up to 20% of the value of the goods, will be imposed on violators. The cargo is anticipated.
• The government will be required, in cooperation with the armed forces, to assume responsibilities such as guiding navigation, monitoring vessel traffic, and protecting the security and environment of the Persian Gulf.
• This plan is still in the expert review stage, and the parliament has asked experts to submit their suggestions for completing it.

Iranian parliamentary initiatives to close or condition the Strait of Hormuz have surfaced repeatedly across past escalation cycles, and the consistent pattern is that the gap between draft legislation and operational enforcement is wide: such plans have historically functioned as signalling instruments rather than implemented policy, since a sustained closure would cut Iran's own export lifeline and invite a multinational naval response. The staging here matters more than the substance; the text is at expert review stage, and prior episodes of this kind have tended to stall, dilute, or be held in reserve as leverage during negotiations. The transmission channel, were any element to be enforced, runs through tanker freight rates, war-risk insurance premia, and rerouting costs rather than an immediate physical supply loss, and crude's risk premium in comparable past episodes has tracked insurer and shipping behaviour more closely than the rhetoric itself. The phraseology excluding US and Israeli-linked tonnage while leaving other transit nominally open mirrors earlier discrimination frameworks that proved difficult to verify or police in practice. The tells worth watching are whether the plan advances through the legislative stages, any corresponding movement in tanker rates and Gulf insurance pricing, and repositioning by the naval coalitions that have historically escorted traffic during prior tanker-war episodes. As a draft text rather than an enacted measure, the signal is one of negotiating posture.