Houthi spokesperson says the Yemeni Armed Forces carried out four qualitative military operations using a number of ballistic missiles and drones, including on the East-West pipeline; will continue their operations deep inside Saudi territory

• The first operation targeted King Khalid International Airport and several pumping stations on the East-West pipeline in the Saudi enemy capital, Riyadh. The strikes were direct, causing fires and damage at the targeted sites.
• The second operation targeted Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and, by God's grace, successfully achieved its objectives.
• The third operation targeted Saudi enemy troop concentrations overseen by the Saudi officer Badr al-Harbi in the al-Mudharabah and Ras al-Arah districts, resulting in a large number of dead and wounded.
• The fourth operation targeted the financial center in the Saudi enemy capital, Riyadh.
• Denies claim that it attacked the East-West pipeline in Medina.

Claims of this kind from the Houthi spokesperson have a long record, and the established pattern is that the group's statements overstate both reach and effect, with independent confirmation from Riyadh, Aramco or satellite imagery historically arriving hours to days later and often showing less damage than claimed. The distinction that matters is the target set: strikes on the East-West pipeline and on Abqaiq touch crude throughput directly, whereas airports and financial centres do not, and it is the processing and pumping infrastructure that has moved prices in past episodes of this kind. The East-West line is the kingdom's route for moving crude to Red Sea export terminals without transiting the Strait of Hormuz, so damage to it tightens the very bypass capacity the market counts on in a Gulf disruption scenario; Abqaiq, as the main stabilisation and processing hub, is the single point whose impairment has previously taken a meaningful share of Saudi output offline even when fields themselves were untouched. The typical sequence in comparable episodes has been an initial risk-premium bid in Brent and WTI, a wait for damage assessment, then partial retracement once restart timelines emerge, with Saudi spare capacity and inventory draws the usual shock absorbers. Tells worth noting are any Saudi or coalition confirmation, tanker and insurance behaviour at Red Sea loadings, and whether the tempo of claimed attacks on energy nodes versus symbolic targets is shifting. Until throughput loss is verified, the claim itself is the event, and past form argues for treating the pipeline and Abqaiq assertions with particular scepticism given the denial on the Medina claim shows the group's account is contested even on its own terms.