Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi posts his interview with Iraqi network, says indirect negotiations with the US are continuing through intermediary countries, including Pakistan and Qatar, despite Washington's public opposition to talks

• Iran previously presented a seven-day initiative to the US, outlining its conditions and proposing to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day.
• US agreed to Iran's seven-day proposal but sought to add several additional conditions, although he declined to disclose their details.
• Araghchi says the additional US conditions concern issues previously addressed during negotiations, while Iran is demanding that Washington first honour all commitments under the earlier Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.
• Iran is prepared to negotiate other outstanding issues once the US fulfils its existing commitments, with both sides able to raise additional matters during final negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement.
• Says three previous rounds of negotiations with the US ended in war against Iran, demonstrating that Washington cannot be trusted to honour agreements.
• Iran reached an understanding with US President Trump during the third round of negotiations, but Trump violated the agreement after adhering to its terms for only two weeks.
• Iran proposed the seven-day initiative to preserve diplomatic engagement, stressing that the door to negotiations remains open provided the US honours previous understandings.
• Araghchi says the US, rather than Iran, is obstructing diplomatic progress, and Washington must demonstrate its seriousness by implementing the conditions to which it previously committed.
• Says the Strait of Hormuz will be fully reopened if the US fulfils its commitments, after which further rounds of negotiations can take place towards a final agreement.

Headline diplomacy over the Strait of Hormuz follows a familiar sequencing: public posturing and maximalist conditions run in parallel with back-channel contact through third-party intermediaries, and Pakistan and Qatar fit the established pattern of Gulf and regional states serving as conduits when direct engagement is politically costly. The claims of past rounds collapsing into hostilities are standard negotiation theatre, each side framing the other as the obstructing party ahead of any formal round, and such rhetoric has historically coexisted with continued indirect contact rather than replacing it. The market-relevant variable is the Hormuz linkage itself: as long as full reopening is conditioned on prior US compliance, the strait functions as leverage, which is the setup under which crude and freight have tended to carry a risk premium that erodes quickly on any confirmed de-escalation. The distinction worth drawing is between a conditional offer to reopen and an actual reopening, since only the latter removes the insurance and shipping cost channel. Tells to track are whether either side names dates or verification mechanics, whether the intermediaries confirm engagement independently, and whether tanker traffic and war-risk premia move ahead of any announcement, which they have tended to do in past episodes. As it stands this is positioning, not progress.