Iran's Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guard says "the routes created by violators in the Strait of Hormuz will soon be closed by blowing up some of the rocky routes located in the strait", Sabareen reports

Threats against the Strait of Hormuz are a recurring feature of Iranian signalling and have historically surfaced during periods of elevated tension, typically as leverage rather than as a prelude to sustained closure, which Tehran has repeatedly stopped short of given its own export dependence on the waterway. The distinction worth drawing is between rhetoric aimed at third-party shipping and declared intent to physically alter the strait itself, which sits further up the escalation ladder than the more familiar harass, seize, or mine playbook, and which would be difficult to execute or sustain without inviting a direct naval response from the US and its Gulf partners. Prior episodes of this kind have tended to price a risk premium into crude through freight rates, war-risk insurance, and the prompt end of the curve rather than through any actual supply loss, with the premium fading when no interdiction follows. The actors matter: an advisor to the IRGC commander is not the chain of command, and such statements have often been walked back or left without operational follow-through. Worth watching is whether the threat is repeated by senior leadership, any movement of naval assets or insurance repricing in the Gulf, and whether crude's front spread and tanker rates corroborate the headline or treat it as noise.