Iran's Deputy FM Ghalibaf refiles a post, which says,"Based on negotiations with Oman, the southern route will be completely closed, if Iran's requirements are not met"

• Full Post: "Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister: Based on the negotiations with Oman, the southern route will be completely closed/ If Iran's requirements are not met even in the event of an understanding with Oman, the Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened/ Iran-Oman talks will continue with the aim of reaching a permanent route that replaces the current 58-year-old route"

Iranian threats to close or restrict the Strait of Hormuz are a recurring instrument of coercive diplomacy, and the historical pattern is that rhetoric of this kind has very rarely translated into sustained physical closure, since doing so cuts against Iran's own crude exports and invites escalation it has previously avoided. What distinguishes this instance is the reference to Oman-brokered talks and a replacement route, which suggests leverage-seeking inside a negotiation rather than an imminent operational move; conditional language tied to 'requirements not being met' has typically marked the bargaining stage, not the execution stage. The transmission channel in past episodes runs through tanker freight rates, war-risk insurance premia, and front-month crude spreads rather than outright supply loss, and those tend to retrace when no vessel interference follows. The tells worth watching are reports of actual harassment or diversion of shipping, statements from the naval command rather than the foreign ministry, and Oman's response, since the deputy foreign minister has form as a messenger rather than a decision-maker on the operational side. As headline risk rather than a confirmed act, the signal is in the sequencing of follow-on rhetoric.