Iran's Major General Rezaei says Iran will not allow any route other than Iran's to open in Strait of Hormuz; "Even if the US brings a ship to the illegal route through the Strait of Hormuz, we will target it."

Rhetoric of this kind from senior Iranian commanders around the Strait of Hormuz has a long history, and the established pattern is that threats to close or control the waterway are issued far more often than they are acted on, since a sustained closure would sever Iran's own crude exports and invite direct confrontation with the US naval presence in the Gulf. The operative distinction is between interdiction threats, which historically lift the geopolitical risk premium in crude, freight rates and war-risk insurance for Gulf loadings without altering physical flows, and actual kinetic incidents against tankers, which are what have durably repriced the front of the oil curve and widened prompt spreads in past episodes. The accompanying assertion that a ceasefire has not been implemented is the more material line, as it frames the shipping threat against active hostilities rather than posturing. What typically matters next is whether rhetoric is matched by visible naval or IRGC deployments, harassment or seizure incidents in the waterway, and any move in tanker insurance pricing, which has tended to be the earliest hard tell. Comments from figures at this level have frequently been calibrated for domestic and negotiating audiences, so the read-through to crude is usually strongest when corroborated by operational activity rather than the statement alone.