Iran's Major General Safavi says the Strait of Hormuz will never re-open in its prior form, Irib reports; Iran and Oman had a mechanism for managing the Strait, this was sabotaged by the US. Iran will fully manage and control the Strait.

Rhetoric of this kind from senior Iranian military figures on the Strait of Hormuz has a long history, and the established pattern is that threats to close or control the strait have been used repeatedly as leverage without the chokepoint ever actually being shut for a sustained period, since doing so would cut Iran's own export lifeline and invite direct confrontation with the naval powers that guarantee passage. The source matters: comments carried by state media from figures outside the operational chain of command have historically been signalling rather than policy, and the tell has been whether operational commanders, tanker traffic data, and insurance and freight rates corroborate the rhetoric. The transmission channel on the occasions when Hormuz risk has genuinely repriced is not the headline itself but the physical side: war-risk premia on hull insurance, VLCC freight rates on the Gulf routes, and any diversion or harassment of tankers, with crude and products moving through the front of the curve while the back end has tended to fade unless flows are actually interrupted. The reference to a sabotaged Iran-Oman mechanism fits the recurring pattern of back-channel arrangements around the strait being asserted and denied in line with the broader state of US-Iran engagement. What has historically mattered next is whether shipping agencies, naval advisories, or actual vessel incidents follow the words, and whether the rhetoric coincides with a breakdown in whatever negotiation track is running, since in past episodes the strait premium has bled out quickly when no physical disruption materialised.