Iran's positions and conditions on the Strait of Hormuz were announced transparently through Pakistan, reports Tasnim citing sources

• A source close to the Iranian negotiating team told Tasnim: Contrary to what some media outlets have said, Asim Munir, the commander of the Pakistani army, who traveled to Iran the other day, was not carrying a threatening message or a similar message from the United States, but rather was seeking to open the space for negotiations and was seeking to convey Iran's conditions and positions to the American side.
• This informed source noted: The return of the United States to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the implementation of its provisions, which include Article 5, i.e. Iranian arrangements on the Strait of Hormuz, are among Iran's conditions, and this issue was announced through Pakistan, and the Pakistani side is seeking to convey them to the American side.

Back-channel signalling through a third-party military interlocutor is the established pattern in US-Iran standoffs, where formal diplomacy is absent and messages travel via regional conduits, in past episodes Oman, Switzerland, Qatar, and Pakistan among them. Two features here are familiar: the effort by the Iranian side to reframe a counterpart's visit away from coercion toward negotiation, and the publicizing of conditions through a semi-official outlet like Tasnim, which historically reflects security-establishment thinking and has been used to float terms while preserving deniability. Conditioning movement on the Strait of Hormuz on a return to a prior arrangement is the standard sequencing in these episodes: leverage over the chokepoint is held rather than exercised, and its credible threat has historically been the variable that moves crude, freight, and insurance pricing far more than actual disruption, which has rarely materialized. The case distinction worth drawing is between messages carried to open talks and messages carried to set preconditions; the former has tended to de-escalate risk premia, the latter to entrench them until the receiving side responds. The follow-ons are whether the American side acknowledges the channel, whether the so-called Islamabad memorandum is confirmed as a genuine prior framework or a negotiating invention, and whether other Iranian organs echo the Tasnim line. As an unverified single-source account citing a named intermediary, the read is directional rather than confirmed.