IRGC says if a threat against Iran occurs again, "hundreds of thousands of miles of energy transmission lines, thousands of power plants, all US and non-US systems, and even global infrastructure connected to the Internet are at risk.", Sepah reports

IRGC says if a threat against Iran occurs again, "hundreds of thousands of miles of energy transmission lines, thousands of power plants, all US and non-US systems, and even global infrastructure connected to the Internet are at risk.", Sepah reports.

Rhetoric of this breadth from the IRGC, threats spanning energy infrastructure, power grids and internet-connected systems, fits a long-established pattern in which Tehran responds to strikes or pressure with maximalist deterrent language before any operational follow-through, and historically the gap between the declaration and the action has been the variable that matters. The transmission channel in past episodes of this kind has run less through physical disruption, which has been rare at the threatened scale, and more through the precautionary bid in crude, freight and insurance costs on Gulf transit, and widening risk premia in regional credit. The distinction worth drawing is between rhetoric attributed to Sepah-linked media and statements carrying formal state or Supreme National Security Council weight; the former has tended to mark negotiating posture, the latter has preceded actual escalation. The actor's prior form is relevant: the IRGC has historically favoured deniable, proxy or calibrated actions over direct strikes on US systems, precisely to control retaliation risk. What is worth watching next is whether the language is echoed or moderated by other Iranian power centres, any movement in tanker rates or shipping advisories for the strait, and the posture of US regional assets. Absent a kinetic trigger, episodes of this kind have tended to fade from pricing within sessions.