Political and security sources estimate that the chance of direct escalation with Iran before the elections is low, but Tehran may try to influence their results by raising oil prices and other disruptions, reports Israel's Hayom

Political and security sources estimate that the chance of direct escalation with Iran before the elections is low, but Tehran may try to influence their results by raising oil prices and other disruptions, reports Israel's Hayom.

Reporting of this kind, sourced to unnamed political and security officials and carried in a domestic outlet with an established editorial lean, is best read as signalling rather than assessment: governments in this position have historically used such leaks to project calm ahead of a vote while framing any subsequent oil strength as externally engineered. The case distinction that matters is between kinetic escalation and price-channel pressure: the former has tended to produce sharp, fast risk-off moves across crude, the shekel and haven FX that partially retrace when supply is untouched, while the latter works more slowly through freight rates, insurance premia and the prompt end of the oil curve, and is harder to attribute and therefore harder to answer. Tehran's prior form in comparable episodes has favoured deniable, below-threshold disruption over direct confrontation, which is consistent with the estimate quoted here. The relevant tells are physical rather than rhetorical: tanker traffic and insurance costs in the Gulf, any widening of timespreads indicating prompt tightness, and whether official rhetoric on either side hardens as the vote approaches. Thin-liquidity sessions have historically amplified headline-driven crude moves of this provenance, with the initial spike frequently fading once the absence of physical disruption is confirmed. Note that 'low probability' language from interested parties has not been a reliable constraint on outcomes in past episodes of this kind.