US President Trump reiterates he has instructed War Secretary Hegseth to substantially reduce joint military exercises with South Korea, based on his very good relationship with North Korea's Kim Jong Un
- Trump adds "I recently asked the President of South Korea if they would like to join us in the Denuclearization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and they said, “No thanks!"
- North Korea have been unthreatening and respectful while Trump has been President.
Full Post: "Based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, of North Korea, I was not happy with the fact that the United States had, long ago, agreed to participate in Joint Military Exercises with South Korea. These exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the United States of America (as usual!), but send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile, to a Country that, as long as Donald J. Trump has been President, has been unthreatening and respectful. Therefore, and based on the fact that it was too late to cancel, I instructed Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, to substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises! While somewhat unrelated (?), I recently asked the President of South Korea if they would like to join us in the Denuclearization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and they said, “No thanks!” Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP"
Unilateral scaling back of joint exercises on the peninsula is not new for this administration; in the previous term comparable suspensions were announced directly by the President, sometimes ahead of consultation with Seoul, and later restored when talks stalled, so reversibility is the defining feature of the pattern. The transmission channel runs through the Korean premium rather than global risk pricing: in past episodes of this kind the KOSPI and the won have taken conciliatory signals toward Pyongyang as mildly supportive, while defence names with peninsula exposure and the regional alliance complex read them as negative, and the moves have historically faded when no follow-through materialised at the negotiating table. The reference to cost-sharing signals the exercises question is partly a burden-sharing lever, which in prior form has tied it to the separate negotiations over Seoul's contribution to US force presence. The inclusion of an Iran ask directed at Seoul is unusual framing and links two theatres that Korean governments have traditionally kept distinct. The follow-ons that matter are Seoul's formal response, whether the USFK posture statement changes, and any reciprocal signal from Pyongyang, since the pattern in past cycles is that the concession precedes the ask. As a social media statement rather than a signed directive, confirmation from the defence apparatus is the first tell.