US President Trump says that he doesn't think an Iran deal is something he wants to do

Rhetoric of this kind from a sitting president on Iran has historically operated on crude through the sanctions channel rather than through direct supply disruption: the question is whether softer talk of a deal was ever pricing an actual return of Iranian barrels, since output under enforcement pressure tends to leak through shadow-fleet and discount channels regardless of formal policy. The distinction worth drawing is between rejecting a deal as a negotiating posture, which has in past episodes preceded renewed talks at tougher terms, and rejecting one as settled policy, which points toward sustained or tightened enforcement, secondary-sanctions risk on buyers and insurers, and freight complications rather than any immediate change to physical flows. Premia attached to Iranian rhetoric alone have tended to fade quickly when not followed by action; the durable moves have come with enforcement steps, shipping incidents, or proxy escalation. The follow-ons are any sanctions or interdiction measures from Treasury, the tone from Tehran and from intermediaries that have carried past rounds of contact, and positioning in the front of the crude curve, where geopolitical premium has historically shown up first. As a single headline with no policy instrument attached, the signal is directional rather than decisive.